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 Marbury v. Madison 
and the Concept of Judicial Deference 
Aditya Bamzai* 
The past several Supreme Court Terms have seen a judicial revitaliza-
tion of sorts for Chief Justice Marshall’s famous directive in Marbury v. 
Madison that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is.”1  In a series of dissenting and concurring opin-
ions, Justices have juxtaposed that statement with the bedrock administrative 
law doctrines requiring reviewing courts to “defer” to an administrative agen-
cy’s reasonable interpretation of its own organic statute and regulations.2  The 
question that these opinions raise can be summarized as follows: If deference 
is required, how can it be said that the reviewing court is declaring “what the 
law is,” rather than allowing some other body to make the declaration?3  
Thus, to take one example, Justice Thomas has argued that judicial deference 
“wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretive authority to ‘say what the law 
is,’ and hands it over to the Executive,”4 because “[j]udges are at least as well 
suited as administrative agencies to engage in [the interpretive] task.”5 
In some respects, this rediscovery of Marbury in the administrative law 
context should come as little surprise.  For one thing, scholars have long rec-
ognized a seeming tension between the notion of judicial deference and Mar-
bury, some going so far as to characterize the Court’s canonical decision in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council as the “counter-
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.  I owe thanks to 
Divya Bamzai, Erin Morrow Hawley, Aaron Nielson, Jeffrey Pojanowski, and the 
editors of the Missouri Law Review.  All errors are my own. 
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
 2. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 3. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1877–78 (2013) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (contending that the “purpose of interpretation is to determine the fair 
meaning of the rule – to ‘say what the law is,’” and “to determine what policy has 
been made and promulgated by the agency, to which the public owes obedience”).  
For a humorous approach to this issue, see Jeffrey Pojanowski, A Socratic Dialogue 
Inspired by “Marbury and the Administrative State,” YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & 
COMMENT (May 26, 2016), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/a-socratic-dialogue-
inspired-by-marbury-and-the-administrative-state-by. 
 4. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
 5. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1222 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177); see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 
834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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Marbury” of the administrative state,6 because it requires courts to accept any 
“permissible” interpretation proposed by the government rather than to adopt, 
even where possible, the best interpretation of a statute.7  The Court’s redis-
 
 6. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
2071, 2074–75 (1990).  For example, a leading casebook introduces the topic of 
Chevron by observing that “we typically think of the judiciary, rather than the execu-
tive, as having the authority to ‘say what the law is,’ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), and judicial review is thought to be an important means for 
ensuring that agencies comply with congressional directives.”  JOHN F. MANNING & 
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
792 (2010); see also id. at 824 (“A prominent objection to the Chevron framework is 
that it entails judicial abdication of the responsibility to interpret the law, a responsi-
bility famously asserted by Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madi-
son.”). 
 7. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see id. at 843 n.11 (reasoning that a reviewing 
“court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute” or “even the read-
ing the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial pro-
ceeding”).  Broadly speaking, two viewpoints have arisen on the apparent tension 
between the Marbury and Chevron models of judicial review.  Compare Cynthia R. 
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989), with Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Adminis-
trative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).  On the first view, the two are thought to 
be irreconcilable.  Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Juris-
diction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1378-79 
(1953) (reasoning that, at the point at which the Supreme Court “squarely h[o]ld[s] 
that, in a civil enforcement proceeding, questions of law can be validly withdrawn 
from the consideration of the enforcement court where no adequate opportunity to 
have them determined by a court has been previously accorded,” it would be time to 
“go[] back to re-think Marbury v. Madison”).  The issue can be cast in “Marbury” 
terms or broader separation-of-powers terms.  See Farina, supra, at 456 (“[W]e cannot 
embrace Chevron’s vision of deference as the handmaiden to separation of powers 
and legitimacy principles without substantially recasting those principles – a recasting 
in which some aspects of existing theory would have to be abandoned and others 
radically reformulated.”); Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Admin-
istrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s 
Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 110 (2000) (“By weakening the influence of our 
politically insulated judiciary over deliberation and drafting among lawmakers, these 
modern doctrines of deference arguably have undermined an important feature of our 
constitutional structure.”); see also Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Read-
ings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 436 (1995) (noting “the Marbury 
view of administrative law,” under which “no deference in interpretation is called for: 
Interpretation is just lawfinding, and courts rather than bureaucrats are given the pow-
er to find federal law”); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 
3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (1986) (noting the argument that “[a]ffording deference 
to an agency’s legal analysis . . . seems facially contrary to the fundamental principle, 
incorporated in Chief Justice John Marshall’s broad dictum in Marbury v. Madison, 
that ‘it is emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’” 
(footnote omitted)).  Indeed, a student note in the 1927 volume of the Harvard Law 
Review observed that “[a]t first blush, it would appear that mere administrative con-
2
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covery of Marbury in this context, thus, lags behind the academic literature 
by several decades.  For another thing, Marbury itself is a decision about 
administrative law, with Chief Justice Marshall devoting many more pages to 
what we would currently characterize as statutory interpretation and adminis-
trative law issues than to constitutional issues.8  That the Court would redis-
cover Marbury in this context, in other words, tends to place Chief Justice 
Marshall’s canonical decision in its appropriate sphere. 
In an important respect, however, the recent opinions paint an incom-
plete picture of Marbury itself.  Marbury’s “say what the law is” statement – 
upon which the various recent opinions have relied – was made in the context 
of interpreting the federal Constitution.  Each of the opinions has neglected 
the lengthy statutory analysis portion of Marbury.  Did Marbury have any-
thing to say about interpretive technique in the many other pages that Chief 
Justice Marshall devoted to statutory interpretation? 
The answer to that question is “yes.”  As I explain in this Article, Mar-
bury’s lessons for the doctrine of judicial deference are richer and more nu-
anced than one might expect from the repeated invocations of Chief Justice 
Marshall’s famous statement.  As a close review of the Chief Justice’s statu-
 
struction of a statute without more would not influence the Court” because “[i]t is for 
the judiciary, not the administrative, to interpret the law.”  Note, The Supreme Court 
on Administrative Construction as a Guide in the Interpretation of Statutes, 40 HARV. 
L. REV. 469, 469 (1927).  On the second view, the doctrine of judicial deference and 
Marbury can be rationalized.  In Professor Monaghan’s words, a reviewing court “has 
discharged its duty to say what the law is” under Marbury once it has determined 
“what statutory authority has been conferred upon the administrative agency,” with 
the court’s role simply “to determine the boundaries of delegated authority.” Mona-
ghan, supra, at 6, 27.  Congress, in other words, has the authority to delegate statutory 
authority to an agency, expressly or implicitly.  Id. at 6.  Statutory ambiguity, thus, is 
simply an indication that Congress intended interpretation to be conducted by agen-
cies, not courts – although the theory presupposes a “fictional, presumed intent” on 
Congress’s part.  Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations 
of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17.  As a result, most have found it necessary to 
articulate some other principle to supplement the “implicit delegation” account.  See 
id. at 516–17 (suggesting that the fictional intent can be justified on the ground that 
“[b]road delegation to the Executive is the hallmark of the modern administrative 
state”); Starr, supra, at 308–09 (reasoning that, because “administrative agencies are 
not subordinate to the federal courts in the organizational structure established by the 
Constitution[,] . . . Article III judges lack general supervisory authority over the agen-
cies,” and noting practical benefits of reliance on agency expertise). 
 8. See Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administra-
tive Law Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 481 n.4 (2004) (observing the rela-
tive imbalance between the pages that Chief Justice Marshall devoted to administra-
tive law issues (approximately twenty-two) and constitutional law questions (approx-
imately five)).  Compare Marbury, 5 U.S. at 153–76 (addressing administrative law 
questions), with id. at 176–80 (addressing judicial review); see also Akhil R. Amar, 
Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 443, 446–47 (1989) (noting in passing the administrative law dimension of 
Marbury). 
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tory analysis reflects, the Marbury Court could be said to consider three types 
of “deference” in the course of its opinion, through its (1) treatment of execu-
tive custom in statutory interpretation, (2) discussion of the “political ques-
tion” doctrine, and (3) use of the ministerial/executive distinction under the 
writ of mandamus. To be sure, none of these three doctrines is the same as the 
“Chevron” doctrine of judicial deference familiar to us today.  But they pro-
vided the framework for much nineteenth-century judicial review of execu-
tive action and later the kernels – or sparks – that established the modern 
doctrine of judicial deference to executive interpretation.  Understanding the 
full picture of Marbury, thus, gives the modern reader a richer understanding 
of nineteenth-century interpretation and the development of judicial deference 
– as well as a way to understand and to critique the recent opinions relying on 
Marbury. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I summarizes Marbury’s statutory 
analysis.  Part II picks up that summary and analyzes each of the three types 
of “deference” discussed in the Marbury opinion.  Part III provides some 
concluding thoughts. 
I. 
Marbury is such a foundational case of American public law that its 
summary may seem almost unnecessary.  But the case is typically studied 
today for its role in the development of the doctrine of judicial review – the 
notion that the Constitution gives Article III courts the authority to deem un-
constitutional congressional enactments.9  That very centrality as a constitu-
tional decision in modern debates can obscure its other important holdings. 
Through the lens of administrative law, Marbury is a case about whether 
and when the judiciary may compel an Executive Branch official to comply 
with his statutory duties.10  The executive actor was James Madison, the new-
ly installed Secretary of State to President Thomas Jefferson, and the asserted 
statutory duty was Madison’s obligation to deliver a commission to William 
Marbury.11  Marbury had been nominated by President Adams to a five-year 
term as Justice of the Peace to the District of Columbia.12  He was confirmed 
by the lame-duck Federalist Senate, and his commission was signed – but not 
delivered – before Adams left office.13  Marbury asked the new Administra-
tion for his commission.14  He was refused.15 In an effort to compel Madison 
 
 9. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 8 (2008); 
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 887, 887 (2003). 
 10. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 484. 
 11. Id. at 483. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss4/11
2016] MARBURY AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 1061 
to deliver his commission, Marbury sought a writ of mandamus directly in the 
Supreme Court.16 
The case called for the Court to consider whether Marbury had a “right 
to the commission” because the existence of the signed but undelivered 
commission meant that he had “been appointed to the office.”17  The Act 
establishing his position provided simply that “there shall be appointed” jus-
tices of the peace as the President “shall, from time to time, think expedi-
ent.”18  A second Act relevant to the question authorized the Secretary of 
State to “affix the . . . seal” of the United States to the commission after “the 
same shall have been signed by the president of the United States.”19  The 
Court held that, under these provisions, Marbury had been appointed.20 
Chief Justice Marshall started from the proposition that, as with consti-
tutional questions, the statutory question “whether a right has vested or not, 
is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority.”21  In 
light of the connection between delivery of Marbury’s commission and his 
appointment,22 the Court took what it believed to be an “obvious” step: Be-
cause appointment was the “sole act of the President,” it was accomplished 
“when it is shown that he has done every thing to be performed by him,” 
which in such a case, was the “open, unequivocal act” of the President’s “sig-
nature of the commission.”23  At that point, as the Court bluntly put it, “[h]e 
has decided” – and “the subsequent duty of the secretary of state is prescribed 
by law, and not to be guided by the will of the president.”24  That course of 
conduct – discretionary presidential signature followed by mandatory Secre-
tary of State affixing of the seal and delivery – was “not a proceeding which 
may be varied, if the judgment of the executive shall suggest one more eligi-
ble, but is a precise course accurately marked out by law, and is to be strictly 
pursued.”25  The Secretary’s conduct was, in other words, a “ministerial 
act.”26 
 
 16. See id.; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789) 
(authorizing the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus “in cases warranted by 
the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, 
under the authority of the United States”). 
 17. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154–55 (1803). 
 18. An Act Concerning the District of Columbia, ch. 15, § 11, 2 Stat. 103, 107 
(1801). 
 19. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 158. 
 20. Id. at 167–68. 
 21. Id. at 167. 
 22. Id. at 157 (reasoning that, because an appointment was “evidenced by no act 
but the commission itself,” the “commission and the appointment seem inseparable; it 
being almost impossible to show an appointment otherwise than by proving the exist-
ence of a commission”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 157–58. 
 25. Id. at 158. 
 26. Id. 
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It is worth pausing here to remark just why this analysis of the relevant 
legal text is by no means “obvious.”  The Act of Congress establishing the 
Secretary of State’s role in affixing the seal to commissions nowhere defined 
his duties as mandatory, nor did it make any mention of delivery.27  It could 
have been plausibly read to allow the Secretary, in his discretion, as guided 
by the President, not to deliver the commission under appropriate circum-
stances.  Indeed, it would have been a perfectly rational statutory scheme to 
allow the President, who undoubtedly would sign the commission in private, 
to change his mind, even after a seal had been affixed.  Had Marshall inter-
preted the statute in this manner – had he concluded, in other words, that the 
decision whether to deliver was in some sense discretionary – his own analy-
sis indicated that mandamus should have been “rejected without hesitation.”28  
And many legal documents were, in ordinary practice, not valid until deliv-
ered.  It may thus have been prudent, in the case of statutory silence,29 to 
adopt a default rule that presidential commissions should be, like these other 
legal documents, considered valid only once delivered.  Marshall recognized 
as much when he cited the case of “a deed, to the validity of which, delivery 
is essential.”30  But he brushed aside the objection on the ground that the stat-
utory scheme contemplated delivery by the President, which was accom-
plished when the President delivered the commission to the Secretary of 
State.31 
Marshall did have a significant, extra-textual point (not heretofore men-
tioned) to buttress his position.  He claimed that his understanding of the Sec-
retary of State’s authority was “the understanding of the government” itself 
and “apparent from the whole tenor of its conduct” – or, to put the point in 
 
 27. My analysis assumes that the text of Congress’s enactments controls when an 
appointment vests and, hence, Chief Justice Marshall’s legal analysis with respect to 
Marbury’s appointment.  Compare Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Appointment 
and Removal of William J. Marbury and When an Office Vests, 89 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 199 (2013) (arguing that an appointment vests whenever the President deter-
mines that it shall). 
 28. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 171; see also id. at 170–71 (observing that a writ could 
reach only actions where the officer was “directed by law to do a certain act affecting 
the absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of which he is not placed under 
the particular direction of the President,” and could not reach questions that were “in 
their nature political” or that required the exercise of “executive discretion”). 
 29. In discussing whether mandamus was an appropriate remedy, Marshall rec-
ognized that Marbury did not request the “performance of an act expressly enjoined 
by statute,” but rather delivery of a commission, “on which subjects the acts of con-
gress are silent.”  Id. at 172.  He viewed that distinction as not “affecting the case.”  
Id. 
 30. Id. at 159.  Many years later, Jefferson remarked to an acquaintance that 
Marshall’s reasoning on this point was a “perversion of law,” because, “if there is any 
principle of law never yet contradicted, it is that delivery is one of the essentials to the 
validity of a deed.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 
1823), in SAUL K. PADOVER, GENIUS OF AMERICA 130 (1961). 
 31. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 159. 
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other words, that his interpretation was consistent with the government’s cus-
tomary practice.32 
In reaching the conclusion that Marbury had a right to his appointment, 
Marshall acknowledged that there were certain “mere political act[s] belong-
ing to the Executive department alone, for the performance of which entire 
confidence is placed by our Constitution in the Supreme Executive, and for 
any misconduct respecting which the injured individual has no remedy.”33  
While recognizing the “difficulty” in distinguishing between executive ac-
tions that were “examinable” and those that were “not,” he reasoned that the 
President possessed “certain important powers” that he could use in “his own 
discretion” and for which he “is accountable only to his country in his politi-
cal character and to his own conscience.”34  When acting pursuant to such 
authority (even if through subordinates), the President’s actions were unre-
viewable: Because the “subjects are political,” “whatever opinion may be 
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still 
there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion.”35  One exam-
 
 32. Id. at 161 (reasoning that the salary of the office commenced from the date of 
the commission, rather than the date of the transmission or acceptance of the commis-
sion and that, if a commission were declined, the successor would be nominated in 
place of the person who had declined to accept, rather than the prior occupant of the 
office).  Similarly, Marshall rejected the possibility that the President could recover 
the commission from the Secretary of State and deliver it to the “grantee of the of-
fice” because such direct delivery “never is so made.”  Id. at 159.  Because no attor-
ney entered an appearance to argue the government’s position in the case, these factu-
al assertions went uncontested.  See Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1235, 1276 (2003).  In the absence of a government appearance, one may question 
how Marshall knew about these practices.  As Professor Merrill notes, it is likely 
“[b]ecause, of course, he served as Secretary of State during the period of time when 
Marbury’s commission was signed by the President and sealed by the Secretary of 
State.”  Merrill, supra note 8, at 500 (speculating that Marshall was “testifying from 
personal knowledge about the practical construction of the law”).  Professor Merrill 
further speculates that “Marshall was playing games” in relating the practice, because 
the “telling question would be whether the government would feel compelled to pay 
any salary in the case of an appointee who rejected the office after the commission 
was delivered.”  Id. at 500 n.81.  When that happened in the early days of the Repub-
lic (due, for example, to the poor state of communications), it seems unlikely, as Pro-
fessor Merrill observes, that any salary would have been due to the candidate from the 
date of the signing of the commission to the date of its rejection.  Id. (citing JEAN 
EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 266–67, 399–400 (1996)); 
see also United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 47 (1932) (observing, over a century 
later, that “the Executive Department has not always treated an appointment as com-
plete upon the mere signing of a commission”) (footnote omitted).  Here, I express no 
view on whether Marshall was “playing games” in invoking the Executive Branch’s 
customary practice.  My focus is on the interpretive methodology that Marshall used, 
rather than the specifics of its application. 
 33. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 164. 
 34. Id. at 165–66. 
 35. Id. at 166. 
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ple of such a “political question,” according to Marshall, occurred under “the 
act of Congress for establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs,” which 
prescribed “duties [that] . . . can never be examinable by the Courts.”36  Thus, 
where the “[e]xecutive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing 
can be more perfectly clear than that [its] acts are only politically examina-
ble.”37 
II. 
As the preceding discussion suggests, there is more to Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion than the simple statement that courts must “say what the 
law is.”  Indeed, notwithstanding that statement, in interpreting the statute 
that gave Marbury his “right” to office, Marshall found occasion to refer to 
“the understanding of the government” itself, which was “apparent from the 
whole tenor of its conduct.”38  He also made clear that there were certain 
“mere political act[s] belonging to the Executive department alone, for the 
performance of which entire confidence is placed by our Constitution in the 
Supreme Executive, and for any misconduct respecting which the injured 
individual has no remedy.”39  And he alluded to a distinction between “dis-
cretionary” and “ministerial” acts for purposes of issuing the legal relief that 
Marbury requested – a writ of mandamus.40  In this Part, I address these three 
issues. 
A. 
Marshall’s invocation of “the understanding of the government . . . ap-
parent from the whole tenor of its conduct” may sound like the modern Chev-
ron doctrine,41 under which the government’s “understanding” often controls 
the meaning of ambiguous statutory text.  But the legal principle upon which 
Marshall was relying differs from Chevron, both in spirit and in application.  
The critical distinction between Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury 
and Justice Stevens’ opinion in Chevron lies in the treatment that the two 
opinions give to the customary interpretations of the statutes at stake in each 
case.42  Marshall relied on the preexisting “understanding of the govern-
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 161. 
 39. Id. at 164. 
 40. Id. at 168–69. 
 41. Id. at 161. 
 42. Cf. Merrill, supra note 8, at 500–01 (“[T]he longstanding practice of consid-
ering executive interpretation of statutes shows that courts have always regarded the 
views of a coordinate branch as being at least as relevant data.  We find such use of 
executive interpretation even in Marbury v. Madison, the supposed standard bearer 
for independent judicial determination of questions of law.”). 
8
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ment,” “apparent from the whole tenor of its conduct” in practice.43  By con-
trast, Chevron declared it to be “basic legal error . . . to adopt a static judicial 
definition” of a statutory term when “Congress itself had not commanded that 
definition.”44  Deference was thus warranted even if the agency’s interpreta-
tion “represent[ed] a sharp break with prior interpretations of the Act.”45 
Put another way, Marbury does involve a form of “deference” to execu-
tive interpretation of statutory text, but the executive interpretation mattered 
because it was evidence of a customary practice under the statutory scheme.  
Implicit in the opinion is the notion that a departure from that customary 
practice was impermissible – because Marshall used the custom to reject the 
Jefferson Administration’s attempt to change the practice.  The “whole tenor” 
of the government’s conduct would matter more, in other words, than the 
government’s then-current legal position. 
Marshall’s reliance on executive custom, while certainly debatable as 
applied in Marbury itself,46 grew out of the concern of nineteenth-century 
lawyers that ambiguity in legal text was a problem to be avoided through the 
settling of meaning as rapidly as possible.  The specific canon of construction 
was invoked in a variety of settings under the rubric that “custom” or “usage” 
was the “best interpreter of laws.”47  A number of cases applied the same 
legal principle.  In Stuart v. Laird (which was decided the same year as Mar-
bury),48 for example, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the practice 
of Supreme Court Justices “riding circuit” without distinct commissions as 
circuit judges.49  The Court explained that, because the “objection” to circuit 
riding was of “recent date,” it was “sufficient to observe, that practice and 
acquiescence under [the Constitution] for a period of several years, com-
mencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible 
answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.”50 
 
 43. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 161. 
 44. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984). 
 45. Id. at 862–63.  See also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–82 (2005) (collecting cases and observing that Chevron 
“deferred to an agency interpretation that was a recent reversal of agency policy”). 
 46. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 520. 
 47. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpreta-
tion, 126 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2649445. 
 48. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803). 
 49. Id. at 309. 
 50. Id.; see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691 (1892) (rea-
soning that “the practical construction of the constitution, as given by so many acts of 
congress, and embracing almost the entire period of our national existence, should not 
be overruled, unless upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible 
with the supreme law of the land”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886) 
(observing that “long usage, acquiesced in by the courts, goes a long way to prove 
that there is some plausible ground or reason for [an interpretation] in the law”). 
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B. 
So much for Marshall’s use of custom to fill in statutory ambiguities.  
What of Marshall’s argument that there existed “mere political act[s] belong-
ing to the Executive department alone, for the performance of which entire 
confidence is placed by our Constitution in the Supreme Executive, and for 
any misconduct respecting which the injured individual has no remedy”?51 
This aspect of Marbury has rightly been viewed as the source for the 
“political question” doctrine,52 under which courts will treat “some constitu-
tional questions as outside the scope of judicial review.”53  But it is worth 
considering the context – specifically, the part of the Marbury opinion – in 
which Marshall invokes this doctrine: the Court’s treatment of whether Mar-
bury had a statutory right to his position.  Thus, Marbury reasons, one exam-
ple of a political question would exist under “the act of Congress for estab-
lishing the Department of Foreign Affairs,” which prescribed “duties [that] 
. . . can never be examinable by the Courts.”54  The “act of Congress,” not 
necessarily the Constitution, would create the “political question.”55 
Here’s another way to understand Marshall’s point: In this passage, 
Marshall is discussing what we might today call a “delegation” of authority.56  
In contrast to certain kinds of ambiguities – which would be resolved over 
time through customary practice (or, alternatively, filled by evidence of a 
 
 51. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 164 (1803). 
 52. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court?  The Fall of the 
Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
237, 239–40 (2002).  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–11 (1962).  In the modern 
era, the doctrine has been given a jurisdictional spin, which has been the subject of 
substantial criticism.  HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW 11–12 (1961).  As early as 1961, for example, Professor Wechsler argued that 
“all the [political question] doctrine can defensibly imply is that the courts are called 
upon to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency of govern-
ment the autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that itself requires 
an interpretation.”  Id. 
 53. Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1910 (2015). 
 54. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166. 
 55. See Chris Michel, There’s No Such Thing as a Political Question of Statutory 
Interpretation: The Implications of Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 123 YALE L.J. 253, 253–54 
(2013) (noting that “[c]ourts increasingly dismiss claims as political questions, espe-
cially in sensitive fields like foreign affairs and national security,” and arguing that “a 
claim to a federal statutory right can never present a political question”) (emphasis 
omitted); see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 
(2012). 
 56. Cf. Grove, supra note 53, at 1938 n.159 (noting that the “modern-day equiva-
lent” of the political question doctrine “would likely be the administrative law princi-
ple that courts may not review actions that are ‘committed to agency discretion by 
law’”) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012)); see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 
608–09 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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contemporaneous understanding) – other kinds of ambiguities were intended 
to “delegate” authority to the Executive Branch.  In such situations, custom 
would not restrain executive flexibility over time, but rather the President 
could (within the scope of the statute) act in “his own discretion” in a way 
that was “accountable only to his country in his political character and to his 
own conscience” and with the courts having “no power to control that discre-
tion.”57  Thus, where the “[e]xecutive possesses a constitutional or legal dis-
cretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that [its] acts are only politi-
cally examinable.”58  In a similar vein, one of the Court’s leading modern 
cases on political questions generally appears to understand the doctrine in 
these terms: 
A controversy is nonjusticiable – i.e., involves a political question – 
where there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . .”  But the 
courts must, in the first instance, interpret the text in question and de-
termine whether and to what extent the issue is textually committed. 
. . .  [T]he concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political 
department is not completely separate from the concept of a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the 
lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion 
that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate 
branch.59 
As Marbury acknowledged, distinguishing between the two kinds of 
ambiguities – those settled by custom and those delegating authority – poses 
a “difficulty.”60  Marshall’s example of the statute authorizing the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs suggests that he may have been considering some 
sort of domestic/foreign distinction, which gave great leeway to the Executive 
Branch in matters of foreign affairs but resolved issues through custom in 
matters of domestic affairs.  And indeed, the Supreme Court tended to treat as 
conclusive the Executive Branch’s foreign affairs determinations in the nine-
teenth century – for example, its judgment that a given country controlled a 
foreign territory.61 
 
 57. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166. 
 58. Id.; see Merrill, supra note 8, at 499, 513 (arguing that this generally 
unacknowledged two-tier structure in Chief Justice Marshall’s reasoning allows for a 
“much greater continuity between Marbury and Chevron,” yet noting that “Marbury 
historically has not been read this way” but rather “as endorsing a single standard of 
independent judicial judgment in all matters of law”). 
 59. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993) (citations omitted). 
 60. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 165–66. 
 61. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839).  The same principles 
were applied in a number of other circumstances, however, such as cases that, alt-
hough domestic, turned on questions of sovereignty.  See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 
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Although Marbury itself does not use the terminology, the political 
question doctrine was reframed as a distinction between legal issues (which 
were for courts to decide) and factual issues (which were for the Executive 
Branch).  Political questions, in Professor Grove’s words, were traditionally 
“factual determinations made by the political branches that courts treated as 
conclusive in the course of resolving cases.”62  An illustration of the use of 
this kind of terminology in a political question case is Justice Story’s opinion 
in Martin v. Mott.63  That case arose out of President Madison’s decision to 
call the militia into service during the War of 1812 between the United States 
and the United Kingdom.64  A law enacted in 1795, which Madison invoked, 
authorized the President “whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be 
in imminent danger of invasion[,] . . . to call forth” the militia “as he may 
judge necessary to repel such invasion.”65  Jacob Mott, a private in the New 
York militia, failed to comply with Madison’s calling of the militia.66  Mott 
was court martialed and subjected to a fine and forfeiture, which the govern-
ment enforced by seizing his belongings.67  Mott then sued in state court to 
recover his property.68  As the Supreme Court put it, the question presented 
by the lawsuit was “by whom is the exigency” – in other words, whether the 
Nation was “in imminent danger of invasion” – “to be judged of and decid-
ed?”69  Or put another way: 
 
39 (1849) (political branches have authority to identify the lawful government of a 
State); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133 (1912) (political 
branches have authority to determine whether initiative process is consistent with 
republican form of government); cf. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 
2076, 2118 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Recognition is a sovereign’s official ac-
ceptance of a status under international law.  A sovereign might recognize a foreign 
entity as a state, a regime as the other state’s government, a place as part of the other 
state’s territory, rebel forces in the other state as a belligerent power, and so on.” 
(citing 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1 (1963))); Georgia v. 
Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 77 (1867).  For internal congressional procedure, see Marshall 
Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1892) (court will not look behind bill certi-
fied as enrolled to see whether it matches bill voted on by Congress); Coleman v. 
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939). 
 62. Grove, supra note 53, at 1916. 
 63. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 33 (1827).  For opinions relying on Martin v. 
Mott in this context, see Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 
1433 n.1 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 213–14 (1962).  See also Robert M. Chesney, National 
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1380–81 (2009). 
 64. Martin, 25 U.S. at 28. 
 65. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1,1 Stat. 424, 424 (1975). 
 66. Martin, 25 U.S. at 22, 28. 
 67. Id. at 28. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 29. 
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[Was] the President the sole and exclusive judge whether the exigency 
has arisen, or is it to be considered as an open question, upon which 
every officer to whom the orders of the President are addressed, may 
decide for himself, and equally open to be contested by every militia-
man who shall refuse to obey the orders of the President?70 
The Court held that the President’s decision to call the militia was not 
reviewable by court.71  The Court rested its decision on “the nature of the 
power itself, and from the manifest object contemplated by the act of Con-
gress.”72  As for the “nature of the power,” the Court noted that it was “to be 
exercised upon sudden emergencies, upon great occasions of state, and under 
circumstances which may be vital to the existence of the Union,” during 
which a “prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable to the 
complete attainment of the object.”73  A decision that a militia member could 
challenge the President’s decision “would be subversive of all discipline.”74  
This was, in short, an argument premised on the expertise of the Executive 
Branch in matters of national security, the need for speed and efficiency in 
military matters, and the relative inability of courts to review decisions in this 
context. 
As for the Congress’s “manifest object,” the Court reasoned that the 
“language of the act of 1795” “strongly fortified” its conclusion.75  The Act 
“confided” the decision to the President without “any appeal from [his] 
judgment.”76  In reaching that conclusion, the Court repeatedly characterized 
the President’s determination as a “factual” one in language that echoed the 
Marbury Court’s political question passage.77  As the Court put it, “Whenever 
a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him 
upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction that 
 
 70. Id. at 29–30. 
 71. Id. at 30 (“We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the 
exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is 
conclusive upon all other persons.”); see also Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns. 150, 
150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814). 
 72. Martin, 25 U.S. at 30. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 30–31; see also id. at 31 (“[I]n many instances, the evidence upon 
which the President might decide that there is imminent danger of invasion, might be 
of a nature not constituting strict technical proof, or the disclosure of the evidence 
might reveal important secrets of state, which the public interest, and even safety, 
might imperiously demand to be kept in concealment.”). 
 75. Id. at 31. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 32 (noting that “the delegation and exercise of this power intrusted 
to the Executive of the nation for great political purposes,” and distinguishing it from 
“the humblest officer in the government, acting upon the most narrow and special 
authority”). 
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the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of 
those facts.”78 
Although the introduction of Chevron in domestic statutory cases has 
tended to eliminate the domestic/foreign distinction envisioned by Marbury 
and Martin v. Mott, the principle still endures in modern law.  In United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,79 for example, the Court explained that 
“congressional legislation . . . within the international field must often accord 
to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction 
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved” – a 
principle that the Court has repeatedly invoked to defer to Executive Branch 
foreign affairs and national security determinations.80 
Precisely where to draw the line between “political” and “legal” ques-
tions remains a vexed issue in constitutional law to this day.81  But there are 
three more salient takeaways for purposes of Marbury’s relationship to judi-
cial deference.  First, the Court made its point about political questions in the 
context of its discussion of statutory interpretation – and this point can be 
analogized to our modern conceptions of “delegated” authority through am-
 
 78. Id. at 31–32; see also id. at 30 (“[E]vidence of the facts upon which the 
commander in chief exercises the right . . . .”); id. at 31 (noting that the President “is 
necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance, 
and is bound to act according to his belief of the facts”); id. at 32 (characterizing 
Mott’s argument as being “that the power confided to the President is a limited power 
. . . and therefore it is necessary to aver the facts which bring the exercise within the 
purview of the statute”); id. at 33 (referring to the “fact of the existence of the exigen-
cy” and observing that if this factual question could be challenged, then “the legality 
of the orders of the President would depend, not on his own judgment of the facts, but 
upon the finding of those facts upon the proofs submitted to a jury”); cf. id. at 32–33 
(“When the President exercises an authority confided to him by law, the presumption 
is, that it is exercised in pursuance of law.”). 
 79. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 80. Id. at 320; see also Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) 
(“[U]nless Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally [should 
be] . . . reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and nation-
al security affairs.”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680–83 (1981); Sale v. 
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (invoking President’s foreign 
affairs power as a reason to defer to interpretation of immigration law); CIA v. Sims, 
471 U.S. 159, 169–71 (1985) (invoking executive national security authority as rea-
son to defer); cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 623 (2006) (assuming that 
“complete deference” was due to President’s determination that it was impracticable 
to apply the rules that govern criminal trials to military commissions); see also id. at 
680, 682 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the President’s decision to try 
Hamdan before a military commission for his involvement with al Qaeda is entitled to 
a heavy measure of deference” and remarking that, in this context, the Court’s “duty 
to defer to the Executive’s military and foreign policy judgment is at its zenith”); id. 
at 719 (“[W]here, as here, an ambiguous treaty provision . . . is susceptible of two 
plausible, and reasonable, interpretations, our precedents require us to defer to the 
Executive’s interpretation.”). 
 81. Grove, supra note 53, at 1970–73. 
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biguous statutes.82  Second, some measure of deference in the foreign affairs 
and national security context has long been an established part of the Court’s 
interpretive framework – and has long been understood as consistent with 
Marbury’s directive that the courts must “say what the law is.”83 
And third, the distinction between law and fact later proved to be inte-
gral to the development of modern notions of judicial deference to executive 
statutory interpretation.  In a 1927 book, John Dickinson argued that, as a 
descriptive matter, the scope of judicial review over administrative deci-
sionmaking “focus[ed] ultimately upon the distinction which the courts draw 
between ‘questions of law’ and ‘questions of fact,’” with courts “review[ing] 
for error of law, but not findings of fact, at least where, on the evidence, the 
findings are within the bounds of reason.”84  But, Dickinson argued: “[A]ny 
factual state or relation which the courts . . . regard as sufficiently important 
to be made decisive for all subsequent cases of similar character becomes 
thereby a matter of law,” thus rendering it impossible “to establish a clear line 
between so-called ‘questions of law’ and ‘questions of fact.’”85  And the Su-
preme Court embraced this legal-realist perspective on the law/fact distinc-
tion, thereby providing the analytical basis for the building block cases upon 
which Chevron was later constructed.86 
C. 
One final aspect of Marbury merits discussion: Chief Justice Marshall’s 
treatment of Marbury’s use of the writ of mandamus to seek relief for James 
Madison’s alleged wrong.  That treatment was, in an important respect, so 
cursory that it was quite possible to miss it.  The Secretary of State’s conduct 
 
 82. In this respect, it is peculiar how the “political question” doctrine, as con-
ceived in the mid-twentieth century, became identified with constitutional interpreta-
tion alone.  See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1959) (“[T]he courts themselves regard some questions 
as ‘political,’ meaning thereby that they are not to be resolved judicially, although 
they involve constitutional interpretation and arise in the course of litigation.”). 
 83. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Def-
erence: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron 
to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008); Barkow, supra note 52, at 267 n.158. 
 84. JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN 
THE UNITED STATES viii, 50 (1927). 
 85. Id. at 312. 
 86. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 
U.S. 111 (1944); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Action: A Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2243 
(2011) (“The Chevron opinion’s explicit merger of issues of policy with statutory 
interpretation is of a piece with the Hearst Court’s fictional treatment of legal conclu-
sions as questions of fact.”). 
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was so clearly in violation of statute, Marshall argued in a single sentence, 
that it was a “ministerial act.”87 
Marshall had to establish that the act was “ministerial” because the writ 
of mandamus issued only upon the failure to perform such a kind of act.  
Quoting Blackstone, Marshall acknowledged that mandamus was “a com-
mand issuing in the King’s name from the Court of King’s Bench, and di-
rected to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature within the 
King’s dominions requiring them to do some particular thing therein speci-
fied which appertains to their office and duty.”88  He did not, however, elabo-
rate on the circumstances under which mandamus could issue.  In the words 
of Louis Jaffe, a “series of [English] cases in the years 1700-1740 developed 
the principle that mandamus would not lie when the respondent’s function 
was ‘judicial’ but only when it was ‘ministerial,’” resulting in a distinction 
conferring “an area of ‘discretion’ free from control by the King’s Bench.”89  
Marbury’s request for a writ of mandamus had to fit within this analytical 
framework. 
Marbury therefore takes pains to distinguish occasions where an execu-
tive officer “acts in a case in which Executive discretion is to be exercised” 
from occasions where an executive officer “is directed by law to do a certain 
act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of which 
he is not placed under the particular direction of the President, and the per-
formance of which the President cannot lawfully forbid.”90  Only the latter 
(ministerial) act could be subject to mandamus, whereas the former, “execu-
tive” or “discretionary” act could not. 
Could it not be said that every statutory ambiguity created a “discretion-
ary” duty to interpret the statute, thereby rendering the very act of interpreta-
tion as non-ministerial?  Marbury appeared to reject this view.  While Mar-
bury recognized that “there may be such cases” in “which the injured individ-
ual has no remedy” (because the statutory duty called for the exercise of dis-
cretion),91 the Court concluded that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty cer-
tainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the 
laws whenever he receives an injury.”92  Ambiguous statutory language given 
a customary interpretation, in other words, established a statutory right that 
rendered an executive officer’s task “ministerial.” 
The Court took a different turn under Marshall’s replacement, Chief Jus-
tice Taney.  In Decatur v. Paulding,93 Taney held that mandamus was inap-
propriate because the Secretary’s interpretation of statutory provisions was an 
“executive duty” requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, not a 
 
 87. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 158 (1803). 
 88. Id. at 168 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *110). 
 89. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 332 (1965). 
 90. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 170–71. 
 91. Id. at 164. 
 92. Id. at 163. 
 93. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497 (1840). 
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mere “ministerial act.”94  He argued that executive officials are “continually 
required to exercise judgment and discretion,” including “in expounding the 
laws and resolutions of Congress.”95  Such interpretive decisions, according 
to Taney, were “[i]n general, . . . not mere ministerial duties.”96  Interpreta-
tion, from this perspective, generally involved discretion not subject to man-
damus. 
It was not until the advent of general federal question jurisdiction and 
the expansion of equitable remedies in the late nineteenth century that this 
perspective on the mandamus standard and interpretation began to lose its 
influence.97  And even once it did, the echoes of the mandamus standard were 
heard in the modern era.  As Justice Douglas put the point, the “principle at 
stake” in judicial deference cases “is no different than if mandamus were 
sought – a remedy long restricted, in the main, to situations where ministerial 
duties of a nondiscretionary nature are involved.”98  Chevron, as Justice Scal-
ia argued in his dissent in United States v. Mead Corp., can be understood as 
“in accord with the origins of federal-court judicial review,” because 
“[j]udicial control of federal executive officers was principally exercised 
through the prerogative writ of mandamus,” which “generally would not issue 
unless the executive officer was acting plainly beyond the scope of his au-
thority.”99 
III. 
The preceding discussion of Marbury may seem like so much ancient 
history, were it not for the recent Supreme Court opinions addressing the 
proper relationship between Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, on the one 
hand, and Chevron and deference to executive interpretation, on the other.  
Viewing Marbury through the lens that I have just described gives us a new 
set of tools to analyze, and to critique, those recent opinions.  But even apart 
from the recent opinions, Marbury’s treatment of “deference” – and, by ex-
tension, of semantic ambiguity – has implications for modern legal systems.  
That is because contrasting our modern approaches to legal questions with 
past approaches to those same questions is a form of comparative analysis, 
which can inform us how others approached the same legal issues that we 
face today – and possibly tell us how better to design our own legal institu-
tions – even when those approaches do not necessarily bind us. 
  
 
 94. Id. at 508, 514–15. 
 95. Id. at 515. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Bamzai, supra note 47. 
 98. Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 318 (1958). 
 99. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241–42 (2001) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
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